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Abstract
This thesis presents an approach for designing secure web applications that use client-side
encryption to keep user data private in the face of arbitrary web server compromises, as well
as a set of tools, called CryptFrame, that makes it easier to build such applications. Crypt-
Frame allows developers to encrypt and decrypt confidential data in the user's browser. To
ensure an adversary cannot gain access to the decryption keys or plaintext data, CryptFrame
provides a browser extension that stores the keys and allows only sensitive regions in the
web page to access them. CryptFrame performs templatized verification of sensitive regions
to grant small amounts of trusted client-side code access to plaintext data in the browser.
Finally, CryptFrame provides a principal graph to help users safely change permissions
on shared data in the presence of active adversaries. We use CryptFrame to modify several
existing Django-based applications, requiring few source code modifications and incurring
moderate performance overhead.
Thesis Supervisor: Nickolai Zeldovich
Title: Associate Professor
2
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my advisor, Nickolai Zeldovich, and my collaborator Raluca Ada Popa
for their ideas, guidance, and assistance on this project. I am also grateful to the members
of the PDOS group for listening to presentations, reading paper drafts, and participating in
discussions that helped me improve this work greatly.
3
4
Contents
1 Introduction 11
2 Related work 15
2.1 Web server security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Isolation in a web browser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Cryptographic protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Computation on encrypted data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 User interface security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 Overview 19
3.1 Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2 Building secure web applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3 Trusted components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Sensitive regions 23
4.1 Display integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2 Visual indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3 Django integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4 Backwards compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 Templatized verification 27
6 Principal graph 29
6.1 Principal graph structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2 Principal graph API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.3 Mapping the principal graph to applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7 Implementation 35
7.1 CryptFrame admin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8 Case studies 37
8.1 gradapply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.1.1 Developer effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.1.2 Security analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.2 django-forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2.1 Developer effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5
8.2.2 Admin integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.2.3 Searching on encrypted data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.2.4 Security analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.3 django-messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.4 Password manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
9 Unambiguous user interfaces 45
9.1 UI manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
9.2 Certificate chain manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10 Performance evaluation 47
10.1 Throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.2 Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
11 Conclusion 51
6
List of Figures
3-1 An overview of an application using CryptFrame. Shaded components are
untrusted. Dashed lines indicate components that CryptFrame adds to the
original application. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4-1 CryptFrame displays a green shield icon to inform users when they are
entering data into a sensitive region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5-1 An example illustrating the Django template language. . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6-1 An example of a principal graph for a forum application. Principal nodes
are represented as ellipses and shaded principal nodes represent users with
public keys provided by the identity provider. Principals are labeled with
their public keys and users with their names, for clarity. Rectangles represent
data nodes. A dashed edge from P to Q indicates that P has created a
certificate for Q with the labeled attribute. A solid edge from P to Q
indicates an access relationship: P has access to all data that Q has access to. 31
8-1 CryptFrame template code from gradapply for a form with encrypted inputs.
The argument to the i% sensitive %i tag is the ID of the sensitive region. The
Javascript code inside the SR tells CryptFrame to encrypt sensitive fields of
the form with the principal returned by find-principal. The "encrypted"
class on the textarea element indicates that the value will be encrypted
before the form is submitted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8-2 Example Django template code from gradapply that uses CryptFrame to
decrypt a ciphertext with a given principal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8-3 Two possible SRs for adding a reviewer in gradapply. . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
10-1 Throughput for individual types of requests in django-forum. . . . . . . . . 48
10-2 Latency for different operations in django-forum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10-3 Sources of latency imposed by a sensitive region. The baseline is a page
that loads the posts in a thread, using a single sensitive region. Each bar
shows the decrease in client-side latency that results from removing a single
step that CryptFrame performs when loading the sensitive region . . . . . . 49
7
8
List of Tables
6.1 The API exposed to sensitive regions for working with the principal graph.
Three calls (decrypt, certify, and grant-access) require a principal's
secret key, which is obtained by following key chains starting from the
user's key. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1
8.1 Changes to four existing applications needed to encrypt sensitive data using
CryptFram e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
9
10
Chapter 1
Introduction
A web application's security is at the mercy of the web server, which can often be compro-
mised despite the best intentions of the web application developer, leading to disclosure of
confidential data managed by the application.
A promising approach to protect confidential user data in web applications is to use
Javascript to encrypt the data before it leaves the browser [2, 4, 6, 22, 24]. The hope is that
the server sees only encrypted data and does not learn the decryption key. One example of
such a setting is a competent, honest web developer who wants to host a web application on
a shared hosting provider, but does not trust the hosting provider to always install operating
system security updates or maintain the server's physical security. Another example is a
developer who runs his own web server, but wants to use an inexpensive and potentially
untrustworthy CDN for parts of his application.
In the web application setting, client-side encryption is not sufficient if the web server is
compromised, because a malicious server could tamper with the client-side encryption code,
steal secret keys from the browser, or read sensitive data off the page. Moreover, recent
proposals for computing on encrypted data at the server (e.g., CryptDB for databases [16]
and searching on encrypted text [23]) promise to allow servers to deliver useful functionality
without being able to decrypt confidential data. When these systems are placed in the
web application setting, they no longer provide any security guarantees for the previously
mentioned reasons: a malicious server could provide compromised client-side code that
steals secret data or keys from the browser. Therefore, in the current web security model,
client-side encryption provides only a small increase in security (if any) over encrypting
data on the server [14]. As we discuss in Chapter 2, existing solutions have one or both
of the following shortcomings: either they do not defend against arbitrary server-side
compromises, or they are specific to certain applications.
How can we preserve the benefits of client-side encryption in the web application setting?
In this thesis, we show how to build secure web applications where client-side encryption
indeed protects confidential data - that is, where user data confidentiality is protected against
arbitrary server compromises. Our contributions are three-fold: (1) we identify three key
challenges that developers must address when building secure web applications using client-
side encryption; (2) we provide a set of tools that help developers address these challenges;
and (3) we demonstrate how to apply these ideas to several existing web applications.
The three challenges, along with our approach for addressing each one, are as follows:
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Challenge 1: Verifying code. The server can send arbitrary code to run on the client, so
we must prevent malicious code from accessing sensitive data or the decryption keys, while
allowing legitimate code to access sensitive data for formatting it for display or performing
client-side computation on it.
To address this challenge, we identify an application-agnostic primitive called a sensitive
region that can be added to browsers to facilitate secure web applications. A sensitive region
is an iframe with a separate origin that runs only signed code, so that cryptographic keys
and sensitive data are accessible only to code signed by the developer.
Challenge 2: Verifying data. Even if the user's browser is running the correct web
application code, this code might use dynamic data provided by the untrusted server, e.g.
embedded in the HTML document or received as a response to an Ajax request. This data
could be used in security-sensitive ways, and a malicious server could manipulate the data
to influence what operation the client-side code performs.
We identify access control changes as a common situation in which this challenge
arises. We provide a principal graph abstraction that uses key chaining to cryptographically
enforce access control. The principal graph uses certificate chaining to verify all principal
graph information received from the untrusted server, so that the server cannot perform
unauthorized access changes by manipulating information sent to the client. For example,
to grant access to data, a sensitive region receives a public key from the server to use for
encrypting the data, and the sensitive region verifies a certificate chain to ensure that the
received key is correct.
Challenge 3: Unambiguous user interfaces. An attacker may manipulate the user inter-
face to mislead the user into thinking he is performing one operation when he is in fact
performing another This could resemble well-known attacks like clickjacking or phishing,
or be as simple as changing labels on a form asking for sensitive data.
Addressing this challenge requires building user interfaces that unambiguously identify
the operation being performed. To help users unambiguously identify when they are entering
sensitive data, we provide a visual indicator in our browser extension. We also explore the
challenges in building unambiguous user interfaces that perform access control changes; for
example, if a user is choosing to move a forum post into one of two threads with the same
name, the UI must allow him to disambiguate the two, or else the post might be moved into
a forum other than the one the user intended. We use several case study applications to show
how sensitive regions and the principal graph can be combined with thoughtful UI design to
build secure web applications with dynamic access control changes.
To help developers follow this approach, we provide a browser extension and a server-
side framework, which together we call CryptFrame. The browser extension implements
sensitive regions, and the server-side framework provides libraries for storing and manipu-
lating an application's principal graph, along with deployment scripts.
We used CryptFrame to modify four existing Django applications to protect sensitive
data in the event of a server compromise. Our evaluation shows that CryptFrame works
well for a range of real applications, including a graduate admissions web site, a forum
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application, a messaging application, and a password manager. Using CryptFrame, we
adapted these applications to protect sensitive data by changing under 150 lines of code. Our
design requires no additional network round-trips in many cases, and our early prototype
reduces throughput by 31 % and adds 100-215 msec latency on the client.
CryptFrame and existing approaches for computing on encrypted data [9, 12, 16, 23] are
complementary and can be used together. Without CryptFrame, proposals for computing on
encrypted data lose their security guarantees in the web setting (e.g., a compromised server
can inject Javascript code in the client application and steal the decryption key). CryptFrame
helps these approaches to retain their properties in the web application setting, and we show
an example in Chapter 8.2.3 to demonstrate this point.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys related work. Chapter 3
provides an overview of our approach, assumption, and goals. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 describe
the techniques that we use to build secure web applications. Chapter 7 describes our
prototype implementation of CryptFrame. Chapter 8 describes how we used CryptFrame to
modify several web applications to protect user data from a malicious server, and Chapter 9
explains challenges we encountered in designing Uls for use with CryptFrame. Chapter 10
evaluates CryptFrame's performance, and Chapter 11 concludes.
13
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Chapter 2
Related work
CryptFrame helps developers build web applications that protect data confidentiality despite
arbitrary server compromises, and this is the first work that fully tackles this threat model.
The rest of this chapter describes the relation between our contributions and prior work in
more detail.
2.1 Web server security
Many techniques have been proposed to deal with security vulnerabilities in server-side
web application code: statically checking the application code [3, 26], checking security
rules at runtime [15, 28], or structuring the web application to minimize the impact of
vulnerabilities [10, 13]. While these techniques make it difficult for an adversary to exploit a
vulnerability in the web application, they do not address arbitrary server-side compromises
and they assume the adversary does not get access to certain components; once the adversary
compromises these components, he could gain access to confidential data. We present
applications built with CryptFrame that prevent an adversary withfull access to the server
from getting access to the plaintext data.
Separating authentication from the rest of an application is often done using single
sign-on systems such as OpenID. As we describe later, CryptFrame's identity provider
adopts a similar approach for user login, and for mapping human-readable identities (such
as an email address) to a public key.
2.2 Isolation in a web browser
Several techniques aim to address vulnerabilities in a web application's client-side code
(typically Javascript). BFlow [27] and Clilet [8] prevent untrusted client-side widgets (e.g.,
written in Javascript) from leaking confidential data, and privilege separation can be used to
reduce the amount of trusted code in HTML5 applications [1]. Our design uses privilege
separation in client-side code - between trusted code, which is signed and runs in the
sensitive region with access to the plaintext data, and the rest of the code, which can be
altered by the server and does not have access to plaintext - to protect against arbitrary
server-side compromises.
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Code signing is used to designate trusted code in Java, ActiveX, and others. An important
advantage of code signing is that the signing key need not be available during normal
operation, thus preventing an adversary that compromises the server from modifying signed
code. As we describe later, CryptFrame's templatized verification can be thought of as code
signing for the HTML and Javascript that runs in a sensitive region.
2.3 Cryptographic protection
A position paper by Christodorescu [4] proposes encrypting and decrypting data in a web
browser before sending it to an untrusted web server, but does not describe how to privilege
separate client-side code or distribute keys among users. Several "pastebin" sites encrypt
text in the browser before uploading it to the server, and decrypt it in the browser when
the user comes back to the same page [6, 22]. In these sites, the key is either stored in the
URL's hash fragment [22], or typed in by the user [6], and can be accessed by any Javascript
code from the page. As a result, these techniques work only in the face of passive snooping
attacks. In contrast, we use CryptFrame to develop applications that protect confidential
data in a web application despite active attacks (which can inject arbitrary Javascript code
into the web browser).
Cryptocat [24], an ongoing project, originated as a web application using Javascript
cryptography to allow encrypted chat, but was critiqued for not considering the issues
associated with client-side cryptography [25], which are the very challenges that CryptFrame
addresses. As a result, subsequent versions distributed Cryptocat as a browser extension
rather than a web application. However, this does not provide a general solution because
users would have to install a separate extension for each application that uses client-side
encryption. With CryptFrame, Cryptocat could still be implemented as a web application and
achieve similar security properties, while installing only one extension for all applications.
Scramble [2] is a Firefox extension that uses OpenPGP to encrypt and decrypt data
in social networking sites so that only the intended users can read data and not the social
networking site itself. Scramble suffers from two main limitations. First, Scramble does
not prevent a malicious site from reading data off the page as the user enters it or after the
browser decrypts and displays it, so it does not offer any real security guarantees against a
malicious server. CryptFrame does prevent this attack, by using sensitive regions. Second,
Scramble offers only limited functionality for access control changes, which can be tedious:
when sharing a piece of data with other users, one selects the users from a Scramble "address
book" UI, which allows setting permissions on only one piece of data at a time. To give a
user access to a forum with Scramble, one has to go through every post in every thread of
the forum and give the user access to that post. In contrast, our principal graph abstraction
allows developers to use their existing access control Uls. Therefore, using CryptFrame,
one can directly give a user access to an entire forum.
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2.4 Computation on encrypted data
As mentioned earlier, CryptFrame can be integrated with techniques for computation over
encrypted data [5, 12, 16, 18, 19]. We give an example of this integration in Chapter 8.2.3.
CryptDB [16] processes SQL queries over encrypted data and provides some guarantee
of security in the event that the application server is compromised: that only data of logged-
in users is leaked. CryptFrame provides a stronger guarantee (that no data is leaked in the
event of a compromise, even for logged-in users), does not require a trusted proxy server,
and addresses a setting in which the client is running code provided by the untrusted server,
which CryptDB does not address.
Data preservers [12] use trusted hardware to perform user-approved computations over
confidential data on an untrusted server. Data preservers focus on a web service setting,
where the untrusted server stores and computes on user data but does not serve a web
application that runs on the client. In contrast, we address the web application setting, where
an untrusted server can send malicious Javascript code to the browser to read sensitive data
or change access permissions. In the web application setting, secure data preservers could be
combined with CryptFrame to give the server an interface to compute on sensitive user data,
while protecting against active attackers who manipulate the client-side web application to
gain access to the data (CryptFrame's contribution).
2.5 User interface security
In Chapter 9, we discuss how to use CryptFrame to build secure permission-granting user
interfaces in the presence of active adversaries. Our approach builds on earlier work [11,
20, 21], but applies these ideas to more dynamic permission granting interfaces, when the
trusted user interface may be talking to a compromised server over the network.
17
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Chapter 3
Overview
This chapter provides an overview of our approach for building secure web applications
using client-side encryption, by describing how a developer can build such an application
with the help of CryptFrame. Figure 3-1 shows the major components of a CryptFrame-based
application.
3.1 Threat model
We define a secure web application to be a web application that protects the confidentiality
of sensitive user data without trusting any part of the web server. We assume that the web
application developer is honest and can audit his own client-side application code, but does
not want to trust the entire server stack with users' sensitive data.
CryptFrame helps developers defend against an active attacker who is in complete control
of the web server except for the developer's code signing key. For example, CryptFrame
is designed to help defend against an attacker with physical access to the web server and
database, as long as the signing key is not stored in either of those locations.
CryptFrame's goal is to help developers build applications that keep sensitive user data
confidential from a complete server compromise, even if users view this data in their browser
or change access control permissions.
WeQ erowser WeQ server
0D
Sensitive
region)
Identity
I provider Ir~
Figure 3-1: An overview of an application using CryptFrame. Shaded components are un-
trusted. Dashed lines indicate components that CryptFrame adds to the original application.
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3.2 Building secure web applications
A secure web application that allows users to enter and view sensitive data must isolate
this data on the page and encrypt it before sending it to the untrusted server, and the server
should not be able to trick the user's web browser into running arbitrary code in the isolated
context. To accomplish this with CryptFrame, the application developer decides on sensitive
data that should be encrypted, and marks sensitive regions in the application's web pages
that collect or display sensitive data. The developer then signs the sensitive region code with
his private signing key. Users download and install the CryptFrame browser extension, and
log in at a trusted third-party identity provider, which associates meaningful user identifiers,
such as email addresses, with public keys. Many applications can use the same identity
provider, and the application needs to contact the identity provider only when new users
register or when users switch browsers.
When a user visits a web application that uses CryptFrame, the CryptFrame browser
extension obtains the developer's public key (using one of the methods described below),
verifies sensitive region code, and isolates sensitive regions from the rest of the page. The
extension gives verified sensitive regions access to the user's key, which can be used to
encrypt and decrypt sensitive data.
Sensitive regions enforce that the correct code runs in users' browsers, but this code can
receive data from the untrusted server, which could be used to influence which security-
sensitive operations are performed. In particular, CryptFrame provides a principal graph
abstraction that helps developers cryptographically enforce dynamic access control. How-
ever, the server could provide the wrong key to the principal graph library in the sensitive
region when encrypting sensitive data. For this reason, the principal graph uses certificate
chains to ensure that the keys received from the untrusted server are correct. Sensitive region
code can use a CryptFrame client-side library to securely retrieve keys corresponding to
application-specific principals and use these keys to set access permissions. The principal
graph is stored on the untrusted server, but the key chains and certificate chains ensure that
an attacker cannot make unauthorized changes to the principal graph.
3.3 Trusted components
A secure web application that uses CryptFrame relies on the following assumptions.
* Uncompromised end user machines. End users must be running uncompromised
browsers with the CryptFrame extension obtained from a trusted source. The extension
is application-independent, so users have to download and install it just once to use
any CryptFrame application.
" Developer signing key. The developer must have a private key for signing code. This
key can be kept offline and used only when deploying new code to production. The
user's browser must have some trustworthy means of obtaining the developer's public
key for verifying code; the key could be obtained as an extension to an SSL certificate,
or via an SSL connection to a trusted directory service.
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" Identity provider. CryptFrame requires a trusted third-party identity provider that
associates human-meaningful names, such as email addresses, with public keys. The
identity provider can also serve as storage for private keys, so that users can switch
browsers without needing to export keys. We believe it is reasonable to assume a
trusted identity provider, since it is similar to existing OpenID providers, and its
functionality is limited, application-agnostic, and not on the critical path of most
operations.
" Sensitive region code. When using CryptFrame, developers isolate portions of
their code inside a sensitive region. The code inside sensitive regions is trusted: a
vulnerability inside the sensitive region can be used to steal user data. Developers
should audit their sensitive region code for vulnerabilities (e.g., cross-site scripting).
" Visual indicators. To maintain full security against arbitrary compromises, the user
must determine when he is on the correct website and when he is entering data into
a sensitive region. Otherwise, an attacker who controls the server could perform a
phishing-like attack by redirecting the user to a different site entirely, or by serving a
page that looks the same as the correct one except with all sensitive regions removed,
so that the user enters sensitive data into an unisolated form field. The TLS visual
indicators implemented by all major browsers help with the first of these requirements;
users should always check for the TLS lock icon and verify that the domain name
is correct before entering sensitive data. To help with the second requirement, the
CryptFrame browser extension includes a visual indicator that tells the user when he
is interacting with a form field inside a sensitive region. Security-conscious users
should check for this visual indicator before entering sensitive data in a form field.
Visual indicators such as the TLS lock icon have been shown to be ineffective for
most real users [7]. For that reason, we expect that in practice the CryptFrame
visual indicator will be of use only to expert users. However, applications built with
CryptFrame can still provide some guarantee even if users ignore the visual indicators:
in this case, a secure web application will guarantee that, in the event of a server
compromise, all sensitive user data that existed in the application before the attack
remains confidential. Data that is entered during the attack might be leaked because a
user might be entering data into a part of the page that is not contained in a sensitive
region.
21
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Chapter 4
Sensitive regions
A sensitive region (SR) is a section of a web application's HTML code that is isolated from
the rest of the page ("outer page"). We provide this primitive for the purposes of displaying
or collecting sensitive data, or for granting access to sensitive data. Code running on the
outer page, which is provided by the malicious server, is isolated from the sensitive data
inside the SR. For example, an input widget for entering confidential text, or a form that
moves a post to a different forum, should be contained in a sensitive region. Since these
regions control access to sensitive data, they must be isolated from the rest of the page,
which is untrusted.
To implement sensitive regions, the CryptFrame browser extension runs SR code in an
iframe, which runs in a different origin from the outer page. The Same-Origin Policy [29]
ensures that the outer page cannot read the contents of the sensitive region, or run any code
inside it. Because the CryptFrame extension gives decryption keys only to code running on
its own iframes, the outer page cannot obtain decryption keys.
4.1 Display integrity
The isolation provided by the Same-Origin Policy stops the untrusted page from reading
sensitive data that appears inside the sensitive region, but this isolation cannot stop an
attacker who controls the outer page from manipulating the UI to trick the user into granting
access to sensitive data. Such attacks are known as clickjacking or UI redressing attacks.
For example, suppose a sensitive region contains a button that, when clicked, makes a piece
of data public. An attacker could cover up the sensitive region, place another button on top
of the "Make Public" button (say "Keep Private"), and entice the user into clicking on the
attacker's button. The attack code can remove the button at the last second, letting the click
fall through to the "Make Public" button, which the user did not intend to click.
To prevent such attacks, the CryptFrame browser extension enforces display integrity
for sensitive regions. For example, the sensitive region should be fully visible for a human-
perceivable amount of time before mouse clicks or keystrokes are passed to it. We do not
discuss this further, since a variety of techniques for display integrity have been explored in
prior work [11, 21].
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www.django-forum.com,
Figure 4-1: CryptFrame displays a green shield icon to inform users when they are entering
data into a sensitive region.
4.2 Visual indicator
As discussed in Chapter 3.3, for a web application to protect all sensitive data from a
malicious server, the CryptFrame browser extension must help users determine when they
are entering data into an encrypted text input or file upload widget in a sensitive region. The
CryptFrame extension displays a green shield icon, shown in Figure 4-1, near the address
bar when form fields inside sensitive regions have focus. For example, when a user clicks
on a text box inside a sensitive region, the green shield icon will appear, alerting the user
that the data being entered cannot be read by the web server, and the icon will remain there
for as long as the text box has focus. This mechanism allows security-conscious users to
avoid phishing attacks where the attacker removes a sensitive region from the page without
changing its appearance.
The Same-Origin Policy allows any HTML element in a page to obtain focus, even if
it steals focus from a different origin. As a result, an attacker can change focus to a page
element in the outer page while the user is typing, thereby obtaining at least a few characters
from the user (until the user notices the shield icon is gone). The user can verify that none
of their sensitive keystrokes were pilfered in this way by ensuring the green shield icon
remains after they finish typing; an adversary cannot change focus back to an input element
in a sensitive region after stealing focus.
If a user misinterprets CryptFrame's shield indicator, the application will achieve a
weaker form of security: an attacker who compromises the server will not be able to learn
anything about data that existed in the application before the compromise occurred. To steal
data as it is being entered into the application, the attacker could perform a phishing-style
attack by replacing sensitive regions with HTML that looks the same but is not isolated or
verified. However, the attacker cannot decrypt ciphertexts already stored on the server. To
obtain private keys for decrypting these ciphertexts, the attacker would have to manipulate a
user into granting access to them, but the principal graph abstraction discussed in Chapter 6
ensures that access can only be granted within a verified sensitive region.
4.3 Django integration
As a concrete example of how sensitive regions can be used in real applications, the
CryptFrame server-side framework allows developers to denote sensitive regions using a
{% sensitive %I template tag in their Django templates. CryptFrame also provides several
template tags that can be used within sensitive regions to perform common tasks. For
example, the {% ciphertext %} tag is translated into Javascript code that decrypts a ciphertext.
After denoting sensitive regions with template tags, the developer runs a CryptFrame
deployment script to prepare the templates for the client's browser by annotating sensitive
regions with a special HTML attribute. (This deployment script also signs the sensitive
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region code, as described in Chapter 5.) When a page is rendered in the browser, the
CryptFrame browser extension scans the page for regions that are marked as sensitive with
the special HTML attribute. It replaces these regions with iframes that serve a page on
the extension's origin. The extension uses the postMessage API to send the contents of
the sensitive region to the iframe page to evaluate. Since secret keys are only available
to the extension origin, the sensitive region code cannot read confidential data or make
access control changes until it is run inside the iframe. In the next chapter, we describe how
CryptFrame prevents the attacker from supplying arbitrary code to run inside the sensitive
region.
4.4 Backwards compatibility
Some users might be unwilling or unable to install a browser extension, and we would like
to be able to provide some isolation between the untrusted server and the sensitive data in
this case. Sensitive regions can be implemented without a browser extension, albeit without
any protection against UI redressing and phishing attacks. A trusted server can serve a static
HTML and Javascript page that the developer includes in an iframe. This trusted page can
verify and run sensitive region code. As long as the trusted server is on a different origin than
the rest of the application, the Same-Origin Policy stops the untrusted part of the application
from reading sensitive data that appears inside the iframe. This affords some security to
users who do not have the CryptFrame browser extension installed. However, without an
extension, an attacker can perform a UI redressing attack on an access-granting sensitive
region or a phishing attack to trick the user into entering sensitive data outside a sensitive
region, so the application is not guaranteed to be secure without the extension installed.
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Chapter 5
Templatized verification
Since sensitive region code has access to private keys and sensitive data in plaintext, a SR
should not run arbitrary code provided by the outer page. Instead, the developer should use
a secret signing key to sign the code that runs in sensitive regions, and only SRs running
verified code should be given access to the user's private keys.
What makes this challenging is that many modem web applications are built on frame-
works such as Django, in which developers write templates that are rendered into HTML
documents at runtime. For compatibility with this style of development, we propose a
technique called templatized verification, in which a developer signs a template of the code
that can run inside a SR, and the browser verifies that the running code conforms to this
signed template.
In our prototype, the CryptFrame server-side framework includes a deployment script for
generating templatized signatures. CryptFrame generates a tree representing the sensitive
region contents written in the Django template language, hashes the contents of each node
of the tree, and signs the tree of hashes, including flags for subtrees that can be repeated or
omitted (corresponding to loops and conditionals). This tree of hashes is sent to the browser
along with the sensitive region contents, and the CryptFrame browser extension verifies that
the sensitive region code conforms to the signed template representation. The extension also
sanitizes the contents of template variables, since the sanitization performed by the Django
{% sensitive "messages" %}
<U1>
{% for msg in msgs %}
<li>
{{ msg.title 11
{% if msg.author == user %J(sent by you){% endif %}
</li>
{% endfor %}
</ul>
{% endsensitive %}
Figure 5-1: An example illustrating the Django template language.
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runtime cannot be trusted. Only when the SR code has been verified and sanitized does the
CryptFrame browser extension give it access to private keys.
More specifically, the CryptFrame implementation of templatized verification allows
developers to specify sensitive regions in their templates by surrounding the regions with the
f% sensitive % tag. The developer then runs a CryptFrame deployment script that encodes SR
checksums in JSON. Django parses the template into a list of nodes, each of which contains
a combination of strings, template variables, and other nodes. For each node in this list,
the CryptFrame deployment script appends to the checksum structure a hash if the node
just contains a string, or an object containing the type of the node (e.g. loop, conditional,
template variable) and a recursively computed checksum of the contents of the node.
The deplyoment script appends a sensitive region's checksum structure inside a <checksum>
tag with a signature, and also includes HTML comments to assist the browser extension in
matching the rendered template to the templatized checksum. For example, CryptFrame
surrounds template variables with <! -- dyn -- > comments to indicate to the browser
extension that the contained string is part of a template variable and that the next template
node begins after the closing <! -- /dyn -- > comment. Before running a SR's code, the
CryptFrame browser extension uses these HTML comments to parse the SR's contents
into a list of nodes with checksums, and verifies that this list matches the structure inside
the <checksum> tag and signed by the developer. In our prototype implementation, the
CryptFrame browser extension retrieves the developer's key by asking the IDP for the key
corresponding to the page's origin, which means there must be one global IDP for all appli-
cations using CryptFrame. As discussed in Chapter 3.3, a variety of other key distribution
mechanisms could be used instead, such as including the key in an extension to the SSL
certificate.
For example, consider the template shown in Figure 5-1. The signature on this template
allows the sensitive region to contain an HTML document made up of a <ul> tag, followed
by any number of list items, followed by a </ul> tag. The contents of each list item can be
made up of any string, optionally followed by the string "(sent by you)".
In some cases, templates take input from the untrusted server, giving an attacker some
power to interfere with the contents of the sensitive region. For example, an attacker can
substitute any string for the contents of a template variable, since the developer does not
know at signing time what the contents of the variable should be. For this reason, security-
sensitive text such as form labels should be static strings instead of template variables. In
Chapter 9, we discuss these concerns further and give examples of how developers can use
templatized verification safely and prevent such attacks from compromising security.
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Chapter 6
Principal graph
Sensitive regions and templatized verification greatly reduce the adversary's ability to extract
sensitive data or cryptographic keys from the user's browser. However, sensitive region code
still receives data from the untrusted server that might be used in security-sensitive ways.
For example, consider a web forum application, which allows a user to move a secret thread
to a new forum. A typical UI for this action allows the user to choose the new forum from a
dropdown menu. This dropdown and the associated form should be contained in a sensitive
region to stop malicious code from moving a thread on the user's behalf. However, when the
user submits the form, the untrusted server must provide the public key of the new forum, so
that Javascript code in the user's browser can encrypt the contents of the secret thread using
the new forum's key. If an attacker supplies his own public key, instead of the new forum's
public key, the attacker will be able to decrypt the contents of the secret thread using his
own secret key.
To allow developers to safely obtain and manipulate keys in Uls such as this one, we
introduce a principal graph abstraction for managing access control permissions that are
stored and served by an untrusted server. Since the principal graph uses cryptography to
enforce access permissions, modifications cannot be made without a user's private key;
therefore, the principal graph can be modified only by code running in a sensitive region in a
user's browser, not by the server. Thus, we must also ensure that code running in a sensitive
region cannot be tricked by the untrusted server to make unintended changes to the principal
graph.
6.1 Principal graph structure
The principal graph stores two kinds of nodes. Principal nodes represent any entity in the
application's access control policy, such as users, groups, messages, and discussion threads.
Principals are identified by public keys, and each principal has a corresponding private key.
Data nodes, on the other hand, represent confidential data that is accessible only to a specific
set of principals.
The principal graph also keeps track of two kinds of relationships (edges) between nodes.
An access relationship from principal P to principal Q indicates that Q can access all of P's
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data. This relationship is implemented by encrypting P's private key with Q's public key.
These wrapped keys form key chains, which enforce access permissions cryptographically.
Certificate relationships help secure web applications determine the correct key to use
for encrypting confidential data. For example, if a user wants to move a forum post to a
particular discussion thread, the sensitive region must obtain the public key for the principal
corresponding to this thread. But how does the sensitive region verify that a given public key
is indeed the key for the thread that the user selected? Attribute certificates help applications
perform this verification. Any principal P can create a certificate for another principal Q,
certifying that Q has a particular attribute, which is a { name: "value") pair.
Like other certificate-based systems, the principal graph does not have a cryptographic
mechanism for ensuring that revoked certificates are actually deleted; a principal that is
certified at one time can replay that certificate later even if the signer asks for the certificate
to be deleted. A revocation mechanism, such as a certificate revocation list stored on the
identity provider, could be combined with the principal graph to prevent this problem.
The principal graph uses the trusted identity provider as a root of trust, but it is unde-
sirable to have the identity provider involved with all application-specific access control
changes. The principal graph allows us to limit the involvement of the identity provider to
just providing keys for individual users.
As an example of how to use the principal graph, we return to the example from the
beginning of this chapter, where we described a sensitive region that allows a user to move
a thread into a forum. Suppose a user Alice wants to move a thread into the "Secrets"
forum created by Bob. Let B be the principal representing Bob, and let F be the principal
representing Bob's "Secrets" forum. When Bob creates the forum, B produces a certificate
for F specifying that F has the attribute { forum-name: "Secrets"). Later, when Alice
(whose principal is A) wants to move a thread into the "Secrets" forum, the sensitive region
running on behalf of A can verify that it is encrypting the thread to the intended forum
principal: the sensitive region can use B's public key (obtained from the identity provider)
to verify that the principal received from the server has been certified by Bob as having
the { forum-name: "Secrets") attribute. Any principal can create a certificate for any other
principal, so certificates can be chained to express more complex chains of trust, and using
attributes on these certificate chains allows sensitive regions to express application-specific
trust relationships.
Principals, key chains, and certificate chains form a principal graph, an example of
which is shown in Figure 6-1. This graph represents the access control permissions for
a forum application. Users create groups, forums, threads, and posts. Only users who
have a key chain to the principal for a post can decrypt the post's key in order to read the
post. When granting a group access to a forum, the sensitive region can verify a certificate
chain to ensure that the group key received from the server corresponds to a particular
human-meaningful group name specified by the group's creator.
The principal graph is stored on the untrusted web server, but an attacker can create
certificates or read principals' data only when he knows the corresponding private keys. For
example, an attacker controlling the web server cannot read the data in a particular thread
unless he knows the private key corresponding to that thread, or the private key of a principal
who has access to that thread, because no private keys are stored in plaintext in the principal
graph.
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(forum name,
0x123--- Shared Data)
(forumname,
.ecrets )
' O xald... (threadname,
%Secret plans )
0xde5...
Ox4fl...
"Attack at 11:59AM"
Figure 6-1: An example of a principal graph for a forum application. Principal nodes are
represented as ellipses and shaded principal nodes represent users with public keys provided
by the identity provider. Principals are labeled with their public keys and users with their
names, for clarity. Rectangles represent data nodes. A dashed edge from P to Q indicates
that P has created a certificate for Q with the labeled attribute. A solid edge from P to Q
indicates an access relationship: P has access to all data that Q has access to.
Function Description
Creates a new principal by generating a key pair and storing its public
create-principal (optional name) -* Principal key at the server. Optionally creates and stores a certificate for the name
of the principal, signed by the currently logged-in user.
Looks up a principal with attr1, as certified by a principal with attr2,
lookup-principal(attr1,..., attrN, authority) -a Principal ..., as certified by a principal with attrN, as certified by the user named
authority. Returns a principal only if each of the certificates is valid.
Principal . encrypt(plaintext) -- ciphertext Encrypts plaintext data with the principal's public key.
Principal . decrypt(ciphertext) -* plaintext Decrypts the ciphertext with the principal's secret key.
Principal. certify(subject-princ, attr) -* Certificate Signs (subject.princ, attr) and stores the certificate at the server.
Gives grantee access to all data that Principal has access to, by en-
Principal. grant-access(grantee) crypting Principal's secret key with grantee's public key and storing
the wrapped key at the server.
Table 6.1: The API exposed to sensitive regions for working with the principal graph. Three
calls (decrypt, certify, and grant.access) require a principal's secret key, which is
obtained by following key chains starting from the user's key.
6.2 Principal graph API
The CryptFrame framework provides a server-side library for storing and serving the
principal graph, and a client-side library that runs inside sensitive regions. The client-side
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library allows sensitive regions to look up principals, make changes to the principal graph,
and encrypt/decrypt data. Table 6.1 shows the API that the client-side library exposes to
sensitive regions. The principal graph API is designed so that the principal graph client
library can verify that the results of calls to the API are correct for the arguments that were
passed in: e.g., if the application requests a key with a certain attribute, the client library can
check that the resulting key has a certificate with that attribute.
The principal graph API is designed to be used by Javascript code, but the job of the
Javascript code is to faithfully perform operations requested by the user. Attributes help the
Javascript code translate user intent into principal graph operations by allowing the code
to directly map user inputs (e.g. dropdown items selected by the user) into attributes on
certificates. This means that attributes are often human-meaningful strings. For example,
suppose that Alice is sharing her data with "Bob's group." A secure sensitive region
for performing this action would allow Alice to select from a dropdown menu that lists
group names along with their creators. To look up the principal for the selected group,
the sensitive region code should retrieve the name and creator that are displayed in the
selected dropdown item and use those as attributes in a call to lookup-principalC).
Using human-meaningful names such as "Bob's group" (instead of, for example, randomly
generated identifiers) allows user interactions to be translated directly into principal graph
operations, without giving the attacker a chance to substitute different attributes and thereby
affect the principal being returned. In Chapter 9, we give further examples to explain why
human-meaningful attributes are necessary for building safe sensitive regions that link user
input directly to principal graph manipulations.
6.3 Mapping the principal graph to applications
Typically, a developer uses the principal graph by associating principals with some or all
of the models in the application, and adding principal fields to the models to make this
association explicit. For example, in a forum application, a developer might modify the
thread model to include a principal field. When an object 0 is created, a new principal P
should be generated and O.principal should be set to P.
Next, the developer decides which fields represent sensitive data, such as the body field
of a post model in the forum example. An object's sensitive fields should be encrypted and
decrypted inside sensitive regions. In many cases, if an object 0 has a sensitive field x, then
O.principal will be used to encrypt and decrypt the contents of 0.x.
Other fields of 0 may represent objects that have access to O's sensitive data. For
example, if 0 is an object representing a forum post, then O.thread has access to 0. When
O.principal is created or changed, O.thread.principal should be given access to O.principal
using the principal graph grant-access call.
When principals for objects are retrieved from the untrusted server, the sensitive region
must verify attribute certificate chains for those principals. A model with an associated
principal should have a human-meaningful name field. When users perform actions in the
application, they make security-sensitive decisions based on these human-meaningful names
(such as the title of the forum in which they are placing a thread). Finally, a model with a
human-meaningful name should have one or more certifier fields, indicating principals that
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create the model's certificates. For example, if F is an object representing a forum, F.title is
the human-meaningful name of the forum, and F.creator is a certifier for the forum: when
F is created, F.creator.principal (the principal associated with the user who created the
forum F) creates a certificate saying that F.principal represents the forum with title F.title.
These relationships define the behavior of sensitive regions in terms of the application's
models. When a new object 0 is created, each certifier field should create a certificate for
O's human-meaningful name. If 0.x is a certifier field, then when data is encrypted with
0.principal, the principal must have a certificate signed by O.x, who should have a certificate
signed by a certifier field of 0.x, and so on until the chain ends in a user certified by the IDP.
Similarly, any fields who have access to 0 should be given access via a grant-access call,
using certificate chains formed from the certifier fields to fetch the principals.
In Chapter 7.1, we describe how a developer can provide simple annotations denoting
these relationships, which allow CryptFrame to automatically generate secure interfaces in
an admin application for adding and editing data.
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Chapter 7
Implementation
We implemented a prototype of CryptFrame for Django applications, although our design
can be generalized to other MVC web application frameworks. The server component,
including code to manage the principal graph and sign application templates, consists of
791 lines of Python and 105 lines of C++ (for cryptography). A prototype identity provider
consists of 283 lines of Python and HTML.
The client-side code consists of 1285 lines of Javascript and 481 lines of C++ (for
cryptography), and provides the CryptFrame browser extension (using the Chrome extension
API), the client-side library for manipulating the principal graph, and helper code for
sensitive regions (e.g., for communicating the encrypted contents of input values to the outer
page, encrypting files before uploading them, and redirecting link clicks inside the sensitive
region to the outer page). The browser extension does cryptography by sending requests to
a local C++ server that wraps the functionality of the NaCl cryptography library. For ease of
use by end users, this local server could be deployed as a NPAPI browser plugin.
7.1 CryptFrame admin
We bundle CryptFrame with a custom version of the Django admin application, which is
a built-in management application used by many other Django applications. The Django
admin allows administrative users to create, edit, and view data stored in the application by
providing a generic web-based interface to editing objects. We modified the Django admin
to work with CryptFrame; after the developer provides a few simple annotations on their
data models, users in the CryptFrame admin can view and edit sensitive data without leaking
it.
To use the CryptFrame admin, the developer must first decide which models have
associated principals and add principal fields to these models. Next, the developer
adds four types of annotations to a data model: human-name, sensitive, hasaccess,
and certifier, whose meanings are described in Chapter 6.3. In Chapter 8, we give
more examples of how these annotations are used in case study applications. After the
developer runs a deployment script, administrative users can securely add and edit data in
the CryptFrame admin, where data is encrypted and the principal graph manipulated using
appropriate certificate chains.
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The main challenge in modifying the Django admin for use with CryptFrame is that
it uses one template to render a form for editing an object of any model. This template
uses dynamically generated labels on input fields, which are unsafe to use with CryptFrame
because an attacker can manipulate the labels without failing the templatized verification
check. To specialize these "polymorphic" templates to a particular application, CryptFrame
provides a deployment script that instantiates this template using the labels corresponding to
each model in the application. CryptFrame's admin puts forms for editing annotated models
inside sensitive regions, and adds code inside these sensitive regions to encrypt and decrypt
data, and grant access to the correct principals when objects are created or edited.
Adapting Django admin to use CryptFrame required a 74-line Python deployment script
and 492 lines of Javascript and HTML, as well as 133 lines of Python added or changed
from the original application.
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Chapter 8
Case studies
We used CryptFrame to modify
server compromise: a graduate
Application
gradapply
django-forum
four real applications to protect sensitive data in the case of a
school admissions website, a forum application, a messages
Lines of code changed or added
1
1
2
5
6
9
13
13
28
37
115
2
4
7
7
9
10
21
24
33
117
create user principal
change type of rec. field
admin annotations
create statement and letter principals
app settings changes
add principal to model
enter/view reviews
add new reviewers
enter/view statements
enter/view rec. letters
total (original application: 17,390)
create user principal
key chain caching
app settings changes
view thread
add principals to models
admin annotations
create new post
search thread
create new thread
total (original application: 855)
django-messages 62 total (original application: 881)
password manager 12 total (original application: 499)
Table 8.1: Changes to four existing applications needed to encrypt sensitive data using
CryptFrame.
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application, and a browser-based password manager. In this chapter, we describe these case
studies to demonstrate the following:
First, our approach for developing secure web applications captures the security policy
of real applications and allows the applications to provide meaningful security guarantees.
The applications' access control policies map naturally into principal graphs, leading to
intuitive calls to CryptFrame's API.
Second, using CryptFrame requires minimal developer effort. Moreover, applications
that use the Django admin for access control can instead use our CryptFrame admin applica-
tion with just a few developer annotations.
8.1 gradapply
gradapply manages the graduate school admissions process for a department. There are four
types of users in gradapply: applicants, recommenders, reviewers, and a single department
chair. The chair is specified at install time, while reviewers, recommenders, and applicants
are all created dynamically.
In gradapply, we chose to encrypt three types of sensitive data: the statement of objectives
essays written by applicants, the letters of recommendation uploaded by recommenders, and
the reviews written by reviewers. The application gives all reviewers access to all applicants'
data and to all letters uploaded by recommenders. We mapped this access control policy to
the principal graph as follows.
" At install time, the department chair creates a principal R with a certificate for attribute
{ group: "reviewers" }.
" When an application creates a statement of objectives, a new principal is created
with the attribute { name: "statement" I and R is given access to this principal. The
statement of objectives is encrypted to the {name: "statement" } principal.
" When a recommender enters a new letter of recommendation, a new principal is
created with the attribute {name: "letter"} and R is given access to this principal. The
letter of recommendation is encrypted to the {name: "letter"} principal.
" When a new reviewer is added, the reviewer's public key is looked up at the IDP, and
the reviewer is given access to R.
8.1.1 Developer effort
Modifying gradapply to encrypt/decrypt data and using the principal graph to implement
the above access control policy took 115 lines of code, as shown in Table 8.1. For each
form that collects sensitive data and each location that displays it, we surrounded the region
with the sensitive template tag provided by CryptFrame. Ciphertexts can be decrypted
and displayed by passing the ciphertext and the principal to use for decryption to the
ciphertext template tag. If a SR contains a form that takes sensitive data as input, then
the developer uses the cryptframe.register-encrypted-form function exposed by
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{% sensitive "statement" %}
<script>
cryptframe.register-encrypted-form(
document.getElementById("statement-form"), // form to encrypt
{
"find-principal": function (next) {
Find the principal to use for
encrypting data in this form.
cryptframe.lookup(
[new cryptframe.CertAttr("name", "statement")],
cryptframe.user-email(),
next
}
</script>
<form id="statement-form" action="" method="POST">
<label>Enter your statement of objectives here:</label>
<textarea name="statement-objectives" class=-"encrypted">
</textarea>
<input type="submit" />
</form>
{% endsensitive %}
Figure 8-1: CryptFrame template code from gradapply for a form with encrypted inputs.
The argument to the fx sensitive %i tag is the ID of the sensitive region. The Javascript code
inside the SR tells CryptFrame to encrypt sensitive fields of the form with the principal
returned by find-principal. The "encrypted" class on the textarea element indicates that
the value will be encrypted before the form is submitted.
f% sensitive "view-statement" %}
{% ciphertext folder.statement-objectives folder.principal %]
{% endsensitive %}
Figure 8-2: Example Django template code from gradapply that uses CryptFrame to decrypt
a ciphertext with a given principal.
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{% sensitive "add-reviewer" %}
<label>ff email-label }}</label>
<input type="text" name="new-reviewer-email" />
<input type="submit" />
{% endsensitive %}
(a) An insecure sensitive region form for adding a new reviewer.
{% sensitive "add-reviewer" %}
<label>Enter the email address you would like
to add as a reviewer:</label>
<input type="text" name="new-reviewer-email" />
<input type="submit" />
{% endsensitive %}
(b) This sensitive region is secure because an attacker cannot mislead the user about the function of
the form.
Figure 8-3: Two possible SRs for adding a reviewer in gradapply.
the CryptFrame client-side library to specify which principal to use for encrypting and
decrypting input values. In the example in Figure 8-1, the input is encrypted with a principal
with the attribute {name: "statement"), as certified by the currently logged-in user. The
encrypted class on the input element specifies that the value of the input field should be
encrypted before sending it outside the SR.
One SR in the application performs dynamic access control: any reviewer can add another
user as a reviewer by providing the new reviewer's email address. On form submission, the
SR looks up the new reviewer at the identity provider and then looks up the principal with
the attribute { group: "reviewers") as signed by the hard-coded department chair's email
address. The SR then calls grant-access to give the new reviewer access to the principal
for the reviewers group.
8.1.2 Security analysis
With sensitive regions added into the application for viewing and entering sensitive data,
as long as users enter sensitive data only in form fields that show the CryptFrame visual
indicator, an attacker cannot read sensitive data unless he knows the secret key of the
department chair, a reviewer, or a principal that has been added as a reviewer.
The "add reviewer" form is the most likely pitfall when using CryptFrame, because the
attacker has the ability to manipulate the page outside the sensitive region or the template
within the sensitive region in order to trick the user about the function of the form. For
example, suppose that the sensitive region on this page included only the text input field
where the user is intended to enter the email address of the reviewer to add, but no context
about what the form does. Then the attacker could change the page outside the sensitive
region to trick the user into believing that the text input field is for searching for or banning
a particular user.
40
Similarly, templatized verification allows the attacker to make limited manipulations
within the sensitive region without failing the signature check. For example, the sensitive
region shown in Figure 8-3a is not secure because the attacker could substitute any text in
the emaillabel variable, including "Enter the email address of a user to ban." Therefore,
forms that change access permissions should be entirely contained in sensitive regions with
static context indicating their function, as shown in Figure 8-3b.
8.2 django-forum
django-forum [17] is a standard forum application written in Django. It organizes posts into
threads, and each thread belongs to a forum. Users are organized into groups, and each
forum has a list of groups associated with it. If forum F is associated with group G, then
users in G are allowed to access the posts assigned to threads in F.
In order to demonstrate that CryptFrame integrates with existing techniques for comput-
ing on encrypted data, we modified django-forum to include a feature for searching within a
thread, as we discuss in Chapter 8.2.3. This feature added 43 lines of code to the original
application.
In this case study, we describe how we modified django-forum to encrypt forum posts.
In Chapter 10, we compare the performance of this version of the application to the original,
and to a version in which we encrypt forum and thread titles as well as posts.
8.2.1 Developer effort
The django-forum application allows users to create new threads and posts. It uses the
Django admin to allow users to create forums, move threads, move posts, create groups, and
assign groups to forums. We assigned a principal to each forum, thread, group, and user.
Forum principals have access to principals for their threads, and posts are encrypted with
the principals for their threads. When a new thread is created, the parent forum's principal
creates a certificate for the name of the thread. The only subtlety lies in certifying the new
thread's title using the parent forum's principal instead of the user who creates it. This is
because the groups assigned to theforum determine who can see the data. If a user creates a
new post, knowing the thread's forum as well as the thread title is important for deciding
which thread to put the post in: there might be two threads with the same name, created by
the same user, in both the "Public" and the "Secret" forums, so a certificate signed by the
forum principal (not by the user) is required to differentiate these threads.
After deciding on the principal graph, we modified the django-forum application to
encrypt/decrypt data and to add access to the correct principals when new threads or posts
are created.
django-forum requires several key chains per page load (e.g., one per post in a thread).
Computing key chains by querying the principal graph database is expensive, so the Crypt-
Frame server-side API allows the application to cache all key chains starting at a particular
principal, and to extend key chains that have already been cached. We used these in django-
forum to preload a user's key chains on login, and to extend the key chains of all currently
logged-in users when a new post or thread is created.
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8.2.2 Admin integration
django-forum relies heavily on the admin application, where users can create and edit
forums, threads, and posts. We modified the application to use the CryptFrame admin, using
the following annotations:
* On the forum model, we marked title as the human-meaningful name of the model,
and creator as the certifier field. These annotations allow the admin to translate user
actions directly into principal graph operations. For example, when a user creates a
forum, the admin generates a certificate for the forum principal's title, signed by the
creator. We marked groups as a has-access field, indicating that any users in one
of the forum's groups can decrypt any data that the forum has access to.
" On the thread model, we marked title as the human-meaningful name. We marked
forum as a has-access field and as a certifier field. The certifier annotation
indicates that a thread's forum is responsible for creating a certificate for the thread's
name.
* On the post model, we marked body as sensitive, which tells the admin to encrypt its
contents. We marked thread as has-access. Since a post does not have a principal
of its own, the admin encrypts a post's sensitive fields with the principals of each of
its has-access fields (in this case, the thread principal).
8.2.3 Searching on encrypted data
To demonstrate that CryptFrame can be integrated with techniques for computing on en-
crypted data, we modified django-forum to include a feature that allows users to search for
keywords in posts within a thread. We used the technique described by Song et al. [23] as
implemented in CryptDB [16]. This algorithm uses a key to encrypt a plaintext P, and can
also use the key to compute a token for a keyword W. Anyone with a ciphertext for P and
the token for W can determine whether the plaintext P contains the keyword W, but cannot
learn any other information about P or W.
The client uses this algorithm to encrypt posts, using a thread principal's key for all the
posts in that thread. After the user enters a search keyword inside a sensitive region, the
CryptFrame browser extension uses the thread key to compute a token. The token is sent to
the server, where the application passes it to the CryptFrame server-side library to search
ciphertexts for the keyword. The server learns which ciphertexts match the user's query, but
cannot learn which keyword the user is searching for. The ciphertexts are passed back to the
client and displayed in a sensitive region.
CryptFrame can therefore be easily extended to support computation over encrypted
data using existing techniques. One might also want to implement a keyword search over all
the posts in the application. Using the Song et al. scheme, the client would have to compute
tokens for every single thread key, which might be a prohibitive amount of client-side
computation. If a future cryptosystem allows search over data encrypted with different keys,
then such a system could be integrated as above.
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8.2.4 Security analysis
The admin provides security for django-forum by encrypting sensitive data with keys
obtained from appropriate certificate chains, extracted from the above annotations. As an
example, we explain why the admin sensitive region for editing a thread cannot be used by
an attacker to gain access to sensitive data. The SR includes context explaining what the
form is for ("Change Thread"), as well as all the form input fields with static labels such as
"Title." The SR also prominently displays the email address of the thread owner, and the
button to submit the form. Because the static context tells the user the function of the form
and of each input field, an attacker cannot mislead the user about what an interaction with
the form will do.
The form displays the thread's title and creator, along with a dropdown menu for selecting
a forum. When the sensitive region to edit an existing thread loads, the forum dropdown is
prepopulated with the list of forum titles from the server, each listed with the email addresses
of their owners. When a user moves a thread into a new forum and submits the form, the
SR retrieves two principals with lookup-principal: one for the thread and one for the
forum selected in the dropdown. To retrieve the forum principal, the SR takes the name and
email address directly from the selected dropdown item, and it requests a principal with
the selected title, as certified by the selected creator. To retrieve the thread principal, the
SR takes the thread name from the input field and the owner from the place where it is
displayed in the SR, again forming the certificate chain from these prominently displayed
values. Since the user will submit the form only if the thread and forum are the ones he
intended, and since the certificate chain attributes are populated directly from the fields that
the user sees, the SR performs principal graph changes corresponding exactly to the user's
intended action. In other words, if the user intends to move thread X to forum Y, then the
attacker cannot manipulate the outer page or the template within the sensitive region in such
a way as to cause the user to make any changes to the principal graph other than giving the
Y principal access to the X principal.
Since all django-forum access control changes happen in the CryptFrame admin, achiev-
ing security in the actual application is fairly simple. Sensitive regions with forms for
creating a new thread or post include static context describing the form's functionality, and
they display the forum and thread name. Certificate chains are formed from these displayed
names.
8.3 django-messages
django-messagesI allows users to send messages to each other, and we modified the appli-
cation to encrypt the contents of these messages. Since the application has a fairly simple
access control policy, most of the changes involved simply encrypting and decrypting data,
using the CryptFrame ciphertext tag and the register-encrypted-form call to the
client-side library. Each message has its own principal, and both the sender and recipient
principals have access to the message principal.
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Ihttps: //github. com/arneb/django-messages
django-messages uses the Django admin application to allow administrators to view
and edit messages, as well as assign a message to be readable by a group of users. We
annotated the message model to be compatible with the CryptFrame admin; a message's
sender, recipient, and group fields are all annotated as has-access fields, and its body is
marked as sensitive.
8.4 Password manager
Our final case study application is a simple browser-based password manager 2 . This ap-
plication consists of a model to represent passwords, and it uses the Django admin for all
password viewing, editing, and sharing. Such applications are very easy to adapt to Crypt-
Frame using our custom admin, requiring just a few annotations on the application's models.
For the password model, we marked the name field as the model's human-meaningful name,
the user field as the certifier, the group and user fields as has-access, and the password as
sensitive.
2https: //github. com/ghickman/django-password
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Chapter 9
Unambiguous user interfaces
In previous chapters, we discussed how to isolate sensitive data from a malicious server and
allow dynamic access control changes. The remaining challenge in building secure web
applications is for the developer to design sensitive region Uls that unambiguously extract
the user's intention from his interactions when granting access to sensitive data (such as
discussed in Chapter 8.2.4). This task is application-specific, so we do not provide one
solution that works for all applications. Instead, we discuss guidelines that we followed to
design secure Uls for our case study applications; we believe that these principles should
apply to other applications as well.
There are two main classes of attacks that developers should defend against: one in
which the attacker can manipulate the UI to mislead the user about the function of the
sensitive region, and one in which the attacker can manipulate the attributes of a certificate
chain without the user noticing. Below we describe how to defend against each of these
types of attacks, using examples drawn from our case study applications.
9.1 UT manipulation
The sensitive region could allow the attacker to mislead the user about the function of the
SR, by manipulating either the outer page context or the dynamically generated parts of the
sensitive region. The attack discussed in Chapter 8.1.2 is an example of this problem, where
an attacker can cause the user to think that he is banning a user when he is in fact adding a
reviewer who can access all data.
To avoid this mistake in our case study applications, for each form that grants access to
sensitive data, we included a description of the form's function and a label on each form
input field inside the sensitive region. These labels are static in the sense that they are
hardcoded strings (not template variables) and they appear in every possible rendering of
the template (i.e. not inside conditionals).
The Django admin is an example of an application in which it is difficult to include this
static context on sensitive region forms. The Django admin uses one template for editing
objects of many different models, so one request might render the template with completely
different form fields than another request. For example, editing a forum post in the Django
admin uses different form fields than editing a thread, but the same template is used when
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editing a post or a thread. This motivates the preprocessing step in the CryptFrame admin,
in which each template is preprocessed into several templates, one for each type of data
in the application: for django-forum, the CryptFrame admin preprocesses the template for
editing a generic model into one template for editing a forum, one template for editing a
thread, and one template for editing a post. Each of these outputted templates has the static
form context that is necessary to ensure the template's UI is unambiguous.
9.2 Certificate chain manipulation
When granting access to sensitive data, the sensitive region can use certificate chains to
verify the authenticity of keys retrieved from the untrusted server. But if the sensitive region
populates this certificate chain with values provided by the attacker and not approved by the
user, then the certificate chain provides no security.
To avoid this mistake in our case study applications, we always constructed certificate
chains either from hardcoded values that are known at install time (like the department chair's
email address in gradapply) or from values displayed to the user during their interaction
with the SR. Consider the example given in Chapter 8.2.4 of moving a thread to a different
forum. Suppose that the user wants to move thread X to forum Y. When the user submits
the form, the sensitive region reads the displayed thread title off the page and looks up a
principal with a certificate for that title. If the title were not displayed on the page, then the
attacker controlling the server could replace it with any thread, and the user would have
no way of knowing that the thread being moved to forum Y is not thread X but in fact a
different thread. This example shows that any dynamic attributes in a certificate chain must
be displayed to the user in such a way that the user would not perform the action if the
attributes were changed by an attacker.
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Chapter 10
Performance evaluation
Although the primary focus of CryptFrame is security, this chapter quantifies CryptFrame's
performance overheads. We measure the throughput and latency of CryptFrame for django-
forum, because it had the most complex access control policy of our case study applications.
We ran django-forum on an Intel Xeon server (using only one core for consistency) running
Linux 2.6.32, Django 1.3, Apache 2.2.16, and MySQL 5.1.49. We preloaded the forum with
50 users organized into five groups, and 250 posts organized into 25 threads split among
five forums. To measure latency, we ran Chrome 26.0.1410.43 an Intel Q9400 server with
4GB RAM with the CryptFrame browser extension installed, and we measured the time
from the beginning of the request until the page was fully rendered, averaged over 50 runs.
For throughput, we ran django-forum and the CryptFrame principal graph application on
the same machine, and we ran 10 parallel clients on a 16-core AMD Opteron 8350 system
(so clients were not a bottleneck) for two minutes, simulating users browsing the forum and
creating threads and posts.
For both latency and throughput, we compared the original django-forum against two
versions of the application modified to use CryptFrame: one version that encrypts just the
contents of forum posts, and another that encrypts forum posts, thread titles, and forum
titles.
10.1 Throughput
Using CryptFrame to encrypt forum posts, thread titles, and forum titles in django-forum
results in a 31 % decrease in overall throughput on our workload, compared to running
unmodified django-forum. When CryptFrame is used to encrypt just the forum posts, the
decrease in overall throughput is 25%. To understand the sources of this decrease, we
measured throughput for each of the individual requests, shown in Figure 10-1.
The clusters labelled "List forums," "List threads," and "Read thread" show throughput
for requests where the clients only read data but do not write anything. The throughput
loss in this type of request is primarily due to extra Django template variables, which
take about 1 msec to resolve a template variable to a value. CryptFrame requires two
additional template variable resolutions for each ciphertext template variable: the principal
used for decryption, and a key chain from the currently logged-in user principal to the
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Figure 10-1: Throughput for individual types of requests in django-forum.
decryption principal. "Read thread" requests incur more overhead due to more ciphertexts.
Similarly, when posts and titles are encrypted instead of just posts, each page load contains
more ciphertext template variables, leading to a higher loss in throughput compared to the
application that just encrypts posts.
The clusters labelled "Create thread" and "Create post" show throughput for requests
that insert new data into the database. In the original application, these requests are at most
two database inserts, but with CryptFrame, the server has to process up to five extra requests
to the CryptFrame principal graph application: looking up the principal for the parent thread
or forum, looking up a key chain from the currently logged-in user to that principal, storing
the principal created for the new object, storing a certificate for the principal, and storing the
wrapped key after calling grant..access. The latter three requests do not occur when a new
post is created, since the post is encrypted with the thread's principal and a new principal is
not created. Similarly, the "Search" cluster shows a large decrease in throughput because
the server has to look up the principal for the thread, look up a key chain for the currently
logged-in user to that principal, and make a foreign function call to the C++ implementation
of the encrypted search described in Chapter 8.2.3.
10.2 Latency
Figure 10-2 shows client-side latency imposed by CryptFrame for different operations in
django-forum. The leftmost three clusters show the latency for loading three pages in
django-forum: the home page ("List forums"), a page listing the threads in a forum ("List
threads"), and a page showing the posts in a thread ("Read thread"). The rightmost three
clusters show the time taken from submitting a form (either to create a thread, create a post,
or search a thread's posts) to receiving a response from the server. CryptFrame adds about
200 msec latency in the worst case. For the leftmost three clusters, CryptFrame adds no
extra round-trips to the server. The rightmost three bars do add round trips to fetch and
store principals and key chains, but we believe that the CryptFrame API could be modified
to allow developers to avoid some of these round trips. For example, the "Create thread"
form could include the parent forum's principal and key chain in the template at render-time,
instead of the client fetching this information when the form is submitted.
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Figure 10-2: Latency for different operations in django-forum.
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Figure 10-3: Sources of latency imposed by a sensitive region. The baseline is a page that
loads the posts in a thread, using a single sensitive region. Each bar shows the decrease in
client-side latency that results from removing a single step that CryptFrame performs when
loading the sensitive region.
To understand where CryptFrame adds latency, we used a page that loads the posts
in a thread in a single sensitive region, and we measured how latency decreases when
individual operations are removed from the process of loading the sensitive region, as shown
in Figure 10-3. The sources of latency shown in the graph are, from left to right,
" Verifying the developer's signature on the sensitive region's contents ("No sig. verifi-
cation on template").
" Checking that the sensitive region's contents conform to the developer's signed
template ("No templ. verification").
" Sanitizing dynamic data in the sensitive region to ensure that an attacker cannot,
for example, insert a malicious script as the contents of a template variable ("No
sanitization").
" Decrypting the contents of the forum posts ("No decryption").
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" Unwrapping the key chain of the thread principal, to obtain a secret key with which to
decrypt the forum posts ("No keychain unwrap").
" Resolving template variables that look up keychains from the currently logged-in user
to the thread principal ("Static keychains").
" Resolving template variables that look up the thread principal ("Static principals").
All but the last two latency sources occur on the client. At least half the overhead from
each cryptographic operation comes from the XMLHttpRequest to the local server doing
cryptography in C++, so a native-speed Javascript cryptography API would decrease the
client-side latency added by CryptFrame.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
This thesis showed how to protect confidential data in web applications in the face of
arbitrary server compromises, by leveraging client-side encryption. We identified three key
challenges to making client-side encryption secure: verifying code, verifying dynamic data,
and designing unambiguous user interfaces. We further presented CryptFrame, a set of
tools that helps developers build such applications by providing three mechanisms: sensitive
regions, templatized verification, and the principal graph. We used CryptFrame to modify
four existing Django applications to protect user data from the server, showing that with
minimal effort, developers can use CryptFrame to achieve strong security guarantees.
CryptFrame works best with applications that store and serve data for users without
computing on it at the server, though CryptFrame can be integrated with cryptosystems that
allow computation on encrypted data to achieve these benefits of these systems in the web
application setting. One direction for future work is to integrate CryptFrame with other
cryptosystems to allow more types of computation on encrypted data at the server. Further,
developing cryptosystems that allow computation over data encrypted with multiple keys
would be useful for CryptFrame, since a user's data is often encrypted with different keys to
support sharing with other users.
Another direction for future work is applying the ideas presented in this thesis to desktop
or mobile applications. The code delivery model in these settings simplifies the problem
and removes the need for sensitive regions and templatized verification, but ideas from
CryptFrame's principal graph can still be useful when an untrusted server delivers keys to
the client.
We hope that CryptFrame enables web developers to use client-side encryption effec-
tively, by building web applications that offer both functionality and confidentiality against
a compromised web server.
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